

AIRPOUCH

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: American Embassy Tehran

Despatch No. 866

TO: Department of State

DATE: April 11, 1956

REF: Embassy Despatch 844 of April 5, 1956

ACTION: - NEA-4

SUBJECT: The Pakistan-Iran Border Talks as Seen by the Pakistani Ambassador to Iran

*INFO: - PNR-2, OLI-6, P-1, ID-4, GE-1
CIA-7, LISIA-10, OSD-4, ARMY-4*

General REZA, Pakistan Ambassador to Iran and chief Pakistan representative at the Pakistan-Iran border negotiations gave the reporting officer on April 9 his version of the difficulties the two sides are having in arriving at an agreement.

General Reza said the agreement of 1905 on which the talks are being based is very vague and in some cases contradictory. For instance, he said, in the case of the Qaleh Sefid (White Fort) (see reference despatch), it is clearly stated in the agreement that this belongs to Pakistan, but that when the line is drawn according to the geographical points of reference, it is found that the Qaleh Safid is on the Iranian side of the frontier. The Ambassador remarked that the White Fort has no value whatever, strategically or otherwise; in fact, it will be demolished as soon as its ownership is determined, (presumably in Pakistan's favor).

The Pakistan Ambassador said the negotiators had met already "a dozen times", and that he was afraid they must meet "many more times" before they could reach agreement. He added that he was willing to compromise with the Iranians on some points, but that he had "no intention of giving them everything they ask for."

The Ambassador did not seem to think that Baluchistan's scorching heat should prevent the demarcation team from proceeding with their work on the border immediately after the delegates in Tehran arrive at their agreement in principle.

Although the Ambassador was not optimistic on the possibilities of early agreement with the Iranians, he made it equally clear that he was convinced of eventual complete accord with Pakistan's Baghdad Pact ally.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

Philip Clock
Philip Clock
First Secretary of Embassy

Copies to: AmEmbassy Karachi

AmConsulates: Tabriz, Meshed, Isfahan, Khorramshahr

SJC
SJCampbell/nd

CONFIDENTIAL

This Document Must Be Returned to
688.90D/4-1156

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

ALCNC

PR 2415

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

35

Action

NEA

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

W

L

INR

EUR

PX

E

Control: 3833
Rec'd: April 7, 1958
8:13 a.m.

FROM: Tehran

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1862, April 7, 5 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1862, REPEATED INFORMATION ANKARA 80, BAGHDAD 116, KABUL 69, KARACHI 41, LONDON 101.

EMBTel 1852.

British Embassy officer states individual Iranian Foreign Ministry officials have for some days been making informal approaches to British Embassy Tehran re Pakistan-Iran union or federation, and have stated that UK and US encouragement and support for concept might be decisive factor. However, British believe it has little or no merit and have not encouraged Iranians. Newspaper propaganda continues, and possible federation is becoming subject some speculation in Tehran.

CHAPIN

LMS:ET/5

NEA
MISCHON CENTER
APR 11 1958

Correction made
by RM/R

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
TO THE RM/R CENTRAL FILES

688.900/4-758
780.00/4-758
HBS

Confidential File

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

55-52

CONFIDENTIAL

Action
NEA
Info
RMR

Control: 4472
Rec'd: April 8, 1958
10:11 a.m.

MESSAGE CENTER
NEA

This Document must be Returned
to the RM/R Central Files

FROM: Kabul

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1057, April 8, 3 p.m.

SS
G
SP
C
W

SENT DEPARTMENT 1057, REPEATED INFORMATION KARACHI 239, TEHRAN 67, ANKARA 33, LONDON 32, BAGHDAD 25.

L
INR
EUR
PX
WMSC
E

If "Aryan Union" scheme should reach stage of serious consideration by Pakistanian and Iranian Government's (Teheran's 1852 and 1862 to Department), Embassy believes would be serious tactical error not approach RGA at outset with invitation participate in talks. As Department aware, Afghans believe one effect of Baghdad Pact has been to "encircle" Afghanistan, and arming its BP neighbors commonly given as justification for obtaining Russian arms. Failure broach BP proposal to RGA still rankles and is constant source reproaches by Afghan officials to USG representative.

Embassy doubts RGA would participate in talks if invited and believes little possibility Afghanistan would join "union" under terms acceptable to Pakistan and Iran. If Pakistan and Iran negotiate on subject behing RGA's back, however, Afghan interpretation would probably be that this was move create Shiah-oriented federation, under US sponsorship in order strengthen BP eastern wing. Pakistani motivation would now seem as desire increase GOP's ability deal decisively with Afghanistan. (Whether USG actually approved or not, it would be next impossible convince RGA negotiations on such fundamental subject could be entered into by Iran and Pakistan without at least tacit USG approval).

In these circumstances, most probably RGA reaction would be drawn closer to USSR

RGA would probably seek substantial increase in military assistance through stepped-up training and supply of equipment and arms, and might even be willing conclude mutual-defense pact with USSR.

Possibility later adherence Afghanistan to "union", which doubtful in any case, would thus be rendered almost nil.

Only condition

CONFIDENTIAL

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

Correction made
by RM/R

HB S
Confidential File

780.00/4-353
633
300D/4-

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 1057, April 8, 3 p.m., from Kabul

Only condition Embassy can visualize under which RGA might take less alarmed view of "union" would involve Pakistan agreement settle Pushtunistan question simultaneous with announcement Pakistan-Iranian decision federate. In negotiations for Pushtunistan settlement as quid pro quo for Afghan tolerance toward "union" RGA would undoubtedly considerably raise its price above present demand which it now insists could be satisfied by little more than GOP grant cultural and some political autonomy to Pakistan Push-tunistan areas.

Embassy believes Pakistan optimism on future RGA attitude towards "union", and implied optimist on present RGA attitude, totally unjustified.

ELWOOD

CWD/GAF/8

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
TO THE RM/RB CENTRAL FILES

35

Action

NEA

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

W

L

IO

INR

EUR

UOP

E

IRC

DCL

OCB

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

CONFIDENTIAL

Control:

Rec'd:

CORRECTION ISSUED:

4/23/58, 9:15 a.m. B

13713

April 22, 1958

11:14 a.m.

FROM: Tehran - CORRECTED COPY

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1953, April 22, Noon.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1953, KARACHI 43, ANKARA 82, BAGHDAD 119,
LONDON 102, NEW DELHI 21, ISFAHAN, MESHED, KHORRAMSHAHR,
TABRIZ UNNUMBERED.

In conversation April 21 British Ambassador Stevens told me that in audience with Shah on April 19 HIM discussed Aryan union at length. Shah stated idea originally broached to him by President Mirza when he made state visit Iran in October 1956, although in halfhearted manner which apparently was not (repeat not) taken seriously. Shah however revived idea when Mirza passed through Tehran in October 1957, and talks have been held intermittently since. Shah used word "confederation" as well as "federation" in speaking of proposed union and said process might have to be gradual. Terms would include unified army and foreign policy. Shah would be chief of state. Shah saw no (repeat no) reason why Pakistan could not (repeat not) remain in Commonwealth at least at outset. Shah hoped for settlement of Kashmir question before union and did not (repeat not) discount possibility of casting off East Pakistan. For Shah main attractions of union are (1) Pakistan Army, which he considers superior force, and (2) creation large Muslim state vis-a-vis Arab states and India. For Pakistan main attraction is eventual share Iran's oil revenue, which Shah said would reach sufficient proportions in five years to render it possible for Iran to share revenue with Pakistan without outside assistance.

In reply to Shah's question British Ambassador opined Indian reaction to union might be unfavorable. Afghan reaction would be to move closer to USSR.

British Ambassador said gist of what Shah said on subject Aryan union confirmed to him by Pakistani Ambassador in his talk with latter same day.

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

CHAPIN

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS

COPY IS PROHIBITED

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

This copy must be returned to RM/RB central files with notation of action taken.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

54-52

CONFIDENTIAL

Action
NEA

Control: 13713
Rec'd: April 22, 1958
11:14 a.m.

Info
RMR

FROM: Tehran

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1953, April 22, noon

SS

G

SP

C

W

L

IO

INR

EUR

UOP

E

IRC

DCL

OCB

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

SENT DEPARTMENT 1953, KARACHI 43, ANKARA 82, BAGHDAD 119, LONDON 102, NEW DELHI 21, ISFAHAN, MESHED, KHORRAMSHAHR, TABRIZ UNNUMBERED.

In conversation April 21 British Ambassador Stevens told me that in audience with Shah on April 19 HIM discussed Aryan union at length. Shah stated idea originally broached to him by President Mirza when he made state visit Iran in October 1956, although in halfhearted manner which apparently was not (repeat not) taken seriously. Shah however revived idea when Mirza passed through Tehran in October 1957, and talks have been held intermittently since. Shah used word "confederation" as well as "federation" in speaking of proposed union and said process might have to be gradual. Terms would include unified army and foreign policy. Shah would be chief of state. Shah saw no (repeat no) reason why Pakistan should not (repeat not) remain in Commonwealth at least at outset. Shah hoped for settlement of Kashmir question before union and did not (repeat not) discount possibility of casting off East Pakistan. For Shah main attractions of union are (1) Pakistan Army, which he considers superior force, and (2) creation large Muslim state vis-a-vis Arab states and India. For Pakistan main attraction is eventual share Iran's oil revenue, which Shah said would reach sufficient proportions in five years to render it possible for Iran to share revenue with Pakistan without outside assistance.

In reply to Shah's question British Ambassador opined Indian reaction to union might be unfavorable. Afghan reaction would be to move closer to USSR.

British Ambassador said gist of what Shah said on subject Aryan union confirmed to him by Pakistani Ambassador in his talk with latter same day.

CHAPIN

PERMANENT TT/1

CONFIDENTIAL

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

Confidential File

1953 APR 23 PM 6 33

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

12114

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE
REPRODUCED OR TRANSMITTED
IN ANY FORM OR BY ANY MEANS
ELECTRONIC OR MECHANICAL
INCLUDING PHOTOCOPYING, RECORDING,
OR BY ANY INFORMATION STORAGE
RETRIEVAL SYSTEM

SENT TO: Embassy TEHRAN

2121

688.900/4-2258

Origin

EMBTEL 1953

Info

Would appreciate Embassy comments on Iran-Pakistani union and on its regional implications. Would also appreciate Embassy evaluation Shah's comment to British Ambassador oil revenues would reach sufficient proportions in five years for Iran share revenue with Pakistan without outside assistance.

Dist.
Desired
(Offices
Only)

688.900/4-2258

Dulles
DULLES

RM/R	
Anal	41
Rev	
Cat	

Drafted by:

NIA:GTI:HJ Ashford, Jr.:bmh 4/23/58

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Owen T. Jones

Clearances:

SOA - Mr. Soulen

S/S-OR

APR 23 1958 P.M.

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

Confidential

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

688.900/4-2258
LWS

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

35
Action
NEA
Info

Control: 14630
Rec'd: April 23, 1958
9:41 a.m.

FROM: Tehran

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1965, April 23, 3 p.m.

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

W

L

INR

FE

P

UOP

E

IRC

DCL

IOP

OCB

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

SENT DEPARTMENT 1965, REPEATED INFORMATION ANKARA 84, KABUL 73, KARACHI 44.

In our audience this morning Shah touched only briefly on proposed Aryan Federation. He said that he could see a great many difficulties in way of such a federation although it seemed highly logical in the long run. He admitted that advantages for Iran appear at first sight to be greater than those which might accrue to Pakistan but felt that in long run with greatly increased Iranian oil revenues Pakistan would greatly profit from such a union. He planned overnight in Karachi on his way to Far East next month and would have long and serious discussions with Mirza on subject.

CHAPIN

BB:SGC:8

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
TO THE RM/R CENTRAL FILES

688.90D/4-2358

000000000000
HBS

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

CONFIDENTIAL

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS

COPY IS PROHIBITED

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Return to Iron Desk.
ACTION COPY

58-52

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

NEA

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C-1

C-2

W

L

INR

EUR

UOP

E

IRC

DCL

NSA

OCB

CIA

FROM: Tebran

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1974, April 24, 3 p.m.

Control: 15531

Rec'd: April 24, 1958
5:52 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1974 REPEATED INFORMATION KARACHI 45, ANKARA 85, KABUL 75.

Reference: DEPTTEL 2121; EMBTEL 1965.

(1) Embassy inclined accept view of Lt. Gen Yazdan Penah, intimate of Shah, to effect Shah, not Mirza, is driving force behind talk of Aryan Union, and that Shah's musings on this subject sparked primarily by his visions personal and national glory.

(2) Since Pakistan greatly needs hard currency, and might conceivably allow Shah become constitutional head of state in Pakistan, possibility of action toward eventual federation must not be dismissed as impracticable.

(3) Shah stated openly more than year ago that Iran within few years would receive oil revenues of more than \$500 million annually. As Embassy has reported on several occasions, he apparently believes future Iranian oil revenues almost unlimited (EMBTEL 1962), and, since Iranian capacity utilize these revenues will be limited, he may be thinking of proposal that for fixed number years, Pakistan would receive (perhaps in form of long-term loans) any revenues above certain figure (say \$300 million) but not more than another fixed sum (say \$200 million). This would appear to Shah as cheap price for privilege ruling Pakistan and possibly, at later date, Afghanistan, and for obvious advantages to Iran of amalgamation on its armed forces with those its more militarily advanced neighbor.

(4) Shah's estimates future oil revenues have always appeared highly unrealistic, but future discoveries and favorable market conditions might combine to triple or quadruple present revenues

in ten

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with no other copies taken.

683.9007/4-2458

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 1974, April 24, 3 p.m. from Tehran.

in ten years.

(5) Union or close federation with Pakistan under terms on these lines could, with difficulty, be stomached by Iranian public, much depending on extent to which move presented as revival ancient Persian imperial glory.

Iranians always have considered Afghanistan as lost province which would return to fold eventually.

(6) Possibility Iranian acceptance of union plan would be enhanced should Kashmir dispute be settled, and, to lesser extent, should East Pakistan with its alien culture become detached from West Pakistan.

(7) While there are obvious advantages to free world in Iran-Pakistan union or federation, and some basis for federation does exist, Embassy feels that practical difficulties and lack genuine social ties would soon result in strains and stresses within Federation which might result in breakup with greater damage to free world interests than would be warranted by possible advantages.

(8) Another and more immediate danger is lessening Iranian interest in BP, and, more particularly, cavalier treatment by Iran of its ally Iraq and increasing hostility toward Arabs in general. Even loose talk of Aryan union tends encourage Iran along path of increasing anti-Arabism which necessarily weakens ties with Iraq. Aryan Union appears to mean to its proponents a counterbloc against Arab expansionism on one side and against Indian ambitions on the other (EMBTEL 1852).

CHAPIN

AB:JGG/1

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

37

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

NEA

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

L

INR

P

UOP

IRC

OCB

USIA

CIA

FROM: Karachi

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2732, May 4, Noon

Control: 2016

Rec'd: May 4, 1958
5:09 a.m.

MESSAGE CENTER
NEA

This Document must be Returned
to the RM/R Central files

SENT DEPARTMENT 2732, REPEATED INFORMATION KABUL 208, TEHRAN
58, ANKARA 51, BAGHDAD 66.

In talk with Ambassador Mills and me May 3 President touched upon subject possible federation Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mirza said he did not take such speculation seriously, "but I play along". When Afghan King raised subject Mirza says he replied, "Let's settle some of our other problems before we think about this." Mirza explained that had he shown enthusiasm for proposed Afghan-Pakistan merger King would immediately have become suspicious advantages all on Pakistan side. Added that when inclusion Iran mentioned to King, or inclusion of Afghanistan mentioned to Shah, each inclined to bristle.

Our discussion with Mirza mostly of subject transit agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mirza expressed view in this connection that Afghans felt landlocked, which principal reason they stress Pushtunistan issue every opportunity, but that with transit arrangement they would have access to sea via Pakistan, and Pushtunistan would further recede as political issue.

Mirza said Pakistan delegation to Kabul May 20 to complete negotiations would include Amjad Ali and Commerce Minister Rashid (A. Pathan) and that his instructions to them would be to bring home an agreement. He agreed agreement must include extension railroad from Chaumon to Spinbaldak on Afghan side Durand Line.

LANGLEY

MAW:HLH/1

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to central files with no other copies taken.

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

688.90D/5-458 HBS

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

58-52

SECRET

Action

Control: 7463
Rec'd: May 12, 1958
4:33 p.m.

NEA

FROM: Karachi

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2803, May 12, 5 p.m.

G

SP

C

W

L

IO

INR

H

EUR

PX

WMS

E

SEMT DEPARTMENT 2803, REPEATED INFORMATION KABUL 213, TEHRAN 60, ANKARA 53, LONDON 154.

Morning May 12, before arrival Shah in Shah later in day, Prime Minister Noon brought up with me subject possible federation in some form of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan and asked that Secretary be informed as follows:

Noon said Pakistanis had talked with both Shah and King about federation but not inclined to consider it seriously before national elections and maybe not then. However, he said Pakistanis will discuss matter with Shah and King whenever they raise it, because Pakistanis wish to keep on good terms with each, and, if possible, to improve relations between Iran and Afghanistan, which now strained primarily because Iranians consider themselves superior to Afghans, and Afghans resentful this attitude.

Noon said Shah wanted Pakistan Army to use against his own if latter ever revolted. Noon said Pakistanis never would let their Army be used for such purpose. Added Shah not interested in new title. Noon saw little economic advantage tie with Iran and none at all in tie with Afghanistan, but felt Pakistanis more friendly and closer to Afghans, and that association with Afghanistan would permit stationing Pakistan forces at the natural defences of the Hindukush mountains.

Noon admitted there would be talks about possible federation with Shah during his overnight stay in Karachi as guest of President.

LANGLEY

AB: INK/5

PERMANENT

SECRET

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

SECRET FILE

688.907/5-1258

HBS

This Document must be returned
to the RM/R Central Files

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

37

CONFIDENTIAL

CORRECTION ISSUED
5/24/58, 1:15 a.m.
12716
May 19, 1958
9:34 p.m.

Action

Control:
Rec'd:

NEA

FROM: Karachi - CORRECTED COPY

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2891, May 19, 2 p.m.

G

SP

C

W

L

IO

INR

P

UOP

E

IRC

DCL

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

SENT DEPARTMENT 2891; REPEATED INFORMATION TEHRAN 62, KABUL 219,
NEW DELHI 379, DACCA, LAHORE UNNUMBERED.

May 16 Mirza told me he and Shah had discussed federation
Iran and Pakistan during Shah's recent stopover in Karachi, but
Mirza had said no action could be considered until after elections.
Mirza said Shah had claimed there were nine advantages for
Pakistan to one for Iran in alliance, and had stressed in
particular the rapid expansion of income from oil Shah expects,
\$100,000,000 per annum in ten years time. I commended that
Shah's estimate probably grossly exaggerated, and asked if one
point in favor of Iran was not Pakistan Army. Mirza agreed.

LANGLEY

MAW/WDW

This Document must be Returned
to the RM/R Central Files

688.900/5-1958

Correction made
by RM/R

OCT 8 - 1958

FILED

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation

CONFIDENTIAL

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
TO RM/R CENTRAL FILES

37

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

Control: 12716
Rec'd: May 19, 1958
9:34 p.m.

NEA
Info

FROM: Karachi

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2891, May 19, 2 p.m.

G

SP

C

W

L

IO

INR

P

UOP

E

IRC

DCL

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

ATR

SENT DEPARTMENT 2891, REPEATED INFORMATION TEHRAN 62, KABUL 219,
NEW DELHI 379, DACCA, LAHORE UNNUMBERED

May 1 (#) Mirza told me he and Shah had discussed Federation
Iran and Pakistan during Shah's recent stopover in Karachi, but
Mirza had said no action could be considered until after elections.
Mirza said Shah had claimed there were nine advantages for
Pakistan to one for Iran in alliance, and had stressed in particular
the rapid expansion of income from oil Shah expects, \$100,000,000
per annum in ten years time. I commended that Shah's estimate
probably grossly exaggerated, and asked if one point in favor of
Iran was not Pakistan Army. Mirza agreed.

LANGLEY

SW:CV/1

(#)Omission, correction to follow.

6/15

Confidential File

MANENT

CONFIDENTIAL

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

RD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

58
Action

Control: 14324
Rec'd: May 21, 1958
10:34 a.m.

NEA
Info

FROM: Tehran

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2139, May 20, Noon

G

SP

C

W

L

IO

INR

P

UOP

E

IRC

DCL

SENT DEPARTMENT 2139, REPEATED INFORMATION KARACHI 57

Karachi telegram 2891 to Department.

Assume figure of one hundred million dollars per annum mentioned by Shah as expected oil income after ten years time should be one billion dollars since this is figure he has mentioned to me personally.

CHAPIN

MDG-8

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

688.90D/5-2058

HBS

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
TO THE RM/R CENTRAL FILES

JUN 20 1958

FILED

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

PERMANENT

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

CONFIDENTIAL

688.90d/6-958

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

GTI: G.E. MOUSER

(39) M-604

Memorandum of Conversation

XR 788.11

396.1-40

DATE: June 9, 1958

SUBJECT: Aryan Union; Events in the Middle East; the Shah's Visit; the Baghdad Pact.

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Ali Jolli Arblan, Ambassador of Iran
Mr. Murat M. Williams, Deputy Director, GTI
Mr. Grant E. Mouser, Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs, GTI

COPIES TO:

NEA (cc)
GTI - 4 (2cc)

~~SCA~~

~~IS~~

~~HR~~

S/S - 2 (2cc)

~~IR - 2~~

~~U/P~~

Amembassy Tehran

~~Amembassy Karachi~~

JUN 11 1958

13

During lunch today, Mr. Williams commented that we had received a report from our Political Advisor in Honolulu to the effect that the Shah had spoken enthusiastically of union between Iran and Pakistan as the result of talks with Pakistani President Mirza in Karachi. Ambassador Arblan's immediate reaction was to laugh rather uproariously. Sobering quickly, the Ambassador discussed both advantages and disadvantages of the proposed union. He said the Pakistanis had first brought it up--long before the UAR was formed. He remarked that the Iranian people were content with their present lot and the prospects for the future were bright. Iran could eventually feed a population of 40 to 50 million. The Pakistanis must be willing to accept the Shah as sovereign if the union was to have any possibility. He doubted that anything would happen in the near future.

Ambassador Arblan referred to a conversation he had had with the Saudi Arabian ambassador. He said that he had asked the Saudi frankly where his country was going; did he not realize that Saudi Arabia was the immediate target of Nasserism backed by the Soviet Union? The Saudi Ambassador had replied that his country would attempt to follow a neutralist path, acting as arbitrator or mediator where possible.

Turning to the Shah's visit, Ambassador Arblan mentioned the students' conference in Minneapolis on June 27th. He said that he had advised the Shah quite frankly that the students were restive and critical. This was due primarily to the quite normal rebellious nature of students coupled with ignorance of actual conditions in their country. The Ambassador agreed that if the students gave the Shah a chance to talk with them, he would be very persuasive.

CONFIDENTIAL

FILED

JUN 10 1958

The

This Document must be returned
to the RM/R Central Files

CONFIDENTIAL FILE



DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTION

2516

2516

SECRET

(Security Classification)

FOR DC USE ONLY

NO.: CA - 11447, June 27, 1958

COPY NO. 1....

SUBJECT: Transmitting "Study on an Iran-Pakistan Union"

TO: ANKARA, BAGHDAD, KABUL, KARACHI, LONDON, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, TEHRAN.

EUR

NEA

OCB

For the information and records of the Embassy, there are enclosed two copies of a "Study on an Iran-Pakistan Union". On June 11, 1958 the OCB concurred in the recommendations contained in this study as guidelines for the forthcoming visit of the Shah of Iran.

DC/AR

52

DULLES

Enclosure:

Study on an Iran-Pakistan Union dated June 18, 1958.

SECRET

(Security Classification)

DRAFTED BY:

U/OP:ALRichards:rp

APPROVED BY:

U/OP - Arthur W. Richards

CLEARANCES:

NEA - Mr. Murat Williams

688.90D/6-2758

688.90d/6-2758
LWS

S/S CR
JUN 27 1958 PM

SECRET FILE

Two copies of "Study on an Iran-Pakistan Union" to
each of the following:

American Embassy	ANKARA	-	Copy Nos. 15 and 16
"	"	BAGHDAD -	" " 17 and 18
"	"	KABUL -	" " 19 and 20
"	"	KARACHI -	" " 21 and 22
"	"	LONDON -	" " 23 and 24
"	"	MOSCOW -	" " 25 and 26
"	"	NEW DELHI -	" " 27 and 28
"	"	TEHRAN -	" " 34 and 35

CA-10441

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
—
THE UNDER SECRETARY
U/OP

SECRET

June 26, 1958

To : RM/R - Mrs. Livingstone
Pm. 1001 NS

From : U/OP - Rose Perruso

Subject: Transmittal of "Study on an Iran-Pakistan Union"

I attach a distribution list for the "Study on an
an Iran-Pakistan Union".

The report is to be transmitted under cover of a
Department of State Instruction which is now being cleared
in S/S-CR.

DC/R
AS-15✓
NOV
CAL

SECRET FILE

688.908/6-2658

SOA: A.H. MEYER

M-629

(7)

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

688.90d/6-2858
XR 789.13

DATE: June 28, 1958

SUBJECT: Iran-Pakistan Union

PARTICIPANTS: Prime Minister Daud of Afghanistan
Afghan Ambassador Haiwandwal
SOA - Armin H. Meyer

COPIES TO: NEA (cc: 1)

SOA (cc: 3)

Amerbassy, Kabul

S/S (2)

~~CHI~~

Amerbassy, Karachi

INR (2)

~~U~~

Amerbassy, Tehran

JUL 1 1958

12

While aboard plane during his tour of the United States, Prime Minister Daud referred to numerous recent reports in the Tehran press and elsewhere concerning a possible Iran-Pakistan union, with which the name of Afghanistan is also occasionally associated.

Daud stated that he had been unable to ascertain the source of these rumors. At first, he thought it was an outside power, such as the British who were behind this proposal, but he has found no basis for such speculation. Similarly, he had not been able to ascertain whether or not the proposal might be the whim of some Iranian or Pakistani leader.

Prime Minister Daud's reaction to an Iran-Pakistan union appeared to be negative. He saw virtually no affinity between the two countries culturally, economically, politically, or geographically. A union would be complicated, he believed, by Pakistan's commonwealth relationship as well as other current associations of the two countries.

As for Afghanistan, Prime Minister Daud feared that an Iran-Pakistan union would have the same effect as the creation of collective security pacts several years ago, namely, it would "disturb the balance of power" in the immediate area. He indicated clearly that such a union would unavoidably result in driving Afghanistan closer to the Soviet Union. He also indicated that he could see no prospects for Afghanistan's uniting with Pakistan or Iran, at least in the foreseeable future.

NEA:SOA:AHMeyer:mmp

amm
469

CONFIDENTIAL

FILED

GPO 912677

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

This document must be returned
to the RM/R Central Files

688.90d/6-2858

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

This Document must be Returned
to the RM/R Central Files

31

CONFIDENTIAL

Action
NEA

Classification

Control: 2582
Rec'd: October 4, 1958
7:11 a.m.

Info

FROM: Kabul

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 327, October 2, 3 p.m.

W

G

SP

C

L

INR

H

EUR

SENT DEPARTMENT 327; REPEATED INFORMATION KARACHI 60,
TEHRAN 26, ANKARA 04.

Reference: Karachi's telegram 697 and Tehran's 663, both to
Department.

Turkish Ambassador Okan told me September 30th King had told
Turkish President Bayar, during latter's recent visit, that
RGA had received Pakistan proposal for "grouping" Pakistan,
Iran and Afghanistan. King reportedly said he would consider
matter favorable.

MILLS

JMR/1

688.907/10-253

HBS

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

FILED

NOV 10 1958

NEA CENTER
MESSAGE
1958 OCT 6 AM 6 56

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RM/R central files with ~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS~~ ~~COPY IS PROHIBITED~~ ~~UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"~~ taken.

Classification

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

The Document must be Returned
to the RM/R Central Files

Action

NEA

Info

RMR

TOR

AM

EUR

P

UOP

IRC

OCB

USIA

CTA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

Control: 3114

Rec'd: October 6, 1958

FROM: Kabul

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 335, October 6.

SENT DEPARTMENT 335, REPEATED INFORMATION KARACHI 62,
TEHRAN 28, ANKARA 6


Press October 2 reports Foreign Ministry spokesman, in
reply to BAKHTAR correspondent's question regarding news
reports and statements certain foreign personalities
concerning possibility establishment Federation
Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, said no question existed
of RGA participation in such Federation. Spokesman fur-
ther pointed out policy RGA was clear and based neutrality
and non-alliance in any bloc.

MILLS

EV/11

608.900/10-558

HBS



NOV 10 1958

FILED

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to the central files with no other copies taken.

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

67-10/21/58

SECRET

Classification

Control: 11939

Rec'd: October 20, 1958
2:11 p.m.

53
Action
NEA

Info
RMR

SS
W
G
SP
C
IO
INR
EUR

FROM: Tehran

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 785, October 20, 5 p.m.m

001

18

SENT DEPARTMENT 785, REPEATED INFORMATION KARACHI⁴², ISFAHAN,
KHORRAMSHAHR, MESHED, TABRIZ UNNUMBERED.

The Shah spoke to me at some length this morning concerning prospects for union between Pakistan and Iran and said that the change in government in Pakistan should if anything expedite negotiations. However, he intended to proceed slowly and give New Pakistan regime time to consolidate its position. He was most emphatic in stating that so far as he was concerned a common Pakistan-Iran army was the primary essential of any union. He then went on to explain that with increasing oil revenues and added wealth through exploitation minerals et cetera Iran would in the not to distant future be able to support a population of around 70 million which was roughly that of West Pakistan and Iran. When I mentioned East Pakistan he said the best thing that could possibly happen was to work out some exchange arrangement with India involving Kashmir. He then again emphasized the need for strong hard-hitting military force in Pakistan-Iran area with joint training and complete unification.

WAILES

HLH

Date

Placed in RM/R

Correction made
by RM/R

SECRET

Classification

NOV 7 - 1958

FILED

REPRODUCTION FROM THE
COPY IS PROHIBITED.
UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET FILE

MESSAGE CENTER

NOV 21 1958

No(s)

PERMANENT
RECORD COPY

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

67-10/4/58

This Document must be Returned
to the RM/R Central Files

31

CORRECTION

10/21/58, 6:33 A.M.

Action

Classification

Control:

11939

NEA

Rec'd:

October 20, 1958
2:11 P.M.

Info
RM/R

FROM: Tehran

SS

TO: Secretary of State

W

NO: 785, October 20, 5 P.M.

G

SP

C

IO

INR

EUR

The first paragraph of this SECRET message should be corrected to read:

SENT DEPARTMENT 785; REPEATED INFORMATION KARACHI 42,
ISFAHAN, KHORRAMSHAHR MESHED TABRIZ UNNUMBERED.

rn1

688.90D/10-2058

SECRET FILE

Copy No(s)

Destroyed in RM/R

NAME
Date
NEA
MESSAGE CENTER

1958 OCT 21 AM 10 12

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

CORRECTION
Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

SECRET

Classification

Control: 309

Rec'd: November 1, 1958
1:16 p.m.

54-51

Action

EA

Info

FROM: Tehran

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 852, November 1, 5 p.m.

G

SP

C

L

IO

INR

P

UOP

IRC

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

SENT DEPARTMENT 852 REPEATED INFORMATION KARACHI 47, KABUL

Most educated Iranians surprisingly ignorant Pakistan politics and confused by all recent developments. Among perceptive minority, abrogation of constitution by Mirza-Ayub combine pleased Shahs supporters, disheartened his opponents, since Mirza usually regarded as Shah's counterpart, and was pictured here as controlling Pakistan Army as Shah controls Iran Army. Talk of Pakistan-Iranian union was somewhat stimulated, since it commonly believed that Mirza, close friend of Shah, desired union.

Pro-regime individuals among this perceptive minority genuinely shocked by Mirza's fall; Ayub regime seen now as representing military coup against constitutional head of state. Shah's opponents, particularly among rightist military, probably correspondingly heartened.

Talk of Pakistan-Iranian union now declining visibly; one retired pro-Shah officer formerly strongly pro-union now states union with Ayub's army would be suicidal for Shah and would reduce Iran to status of province. Regime appears to be changing its view of Pakistan Army from useful support for Iran regime to potential threat in case of Pak-Iran union.

All informed elements Iran agree Ayub is still good ally Iran and that Pakistan and Iran have common interests. There is open skepticism re Ayub's desire or ability restore constitutional government.

WAILES

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

SECRET

Classification

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

688.90F/11-158

HBS

SECRET FILE

This Document must be Returned
to the RM/R Central Files

Copy No(s) 019

Destroyed in RM/R

Name

TJM/7

Date

2-8-58

OUTGOING
AIRGRAM

Department of State

B 0 0 1 3 2

SECRET

Classification

Origin

NO.

Info

SENT TO: Amembassy KARACHI G-121
Amembassy KABUL G-28
RPTD INFO: Amembassy LONDON G-617

Page of Page

Following recent divergence views in SEATO on question relating to Pakistan-Afghanistan relations transmitted to addressee posts for information only:

1. SEATO Council Representatives draft annual review of developments in treaty area, prepared for inclusion in report (classified QUOTE SEATO-SECRET UNQUOTE) to Council Ministers meeting Wellington next month and forwarded Department for review, contained following sentence in paragraph summarizing situation in Pakistan: QUOTE Communists and Communist-inspired elements are also active on the Afghan and Sinkiang borders of West Pakistan UNQUOTE.

2. Considering assertion RE Afghanistan unsubstantiated and desiring place alleged indirect threats to treaty area in proper perspective, Department proposed following change this sentence in cable to Embassy Bangkok February 26: QUOTE While Department aware significance Communist activity on Gilgit-Sinkiang border we have no evidence such activity on Afghan border and urge deletion reference thereto UNQUOTE.

3. Embassy Bangkok reported as follows February 28: QUOTE Council Representatives today accepted all changes with exception deletion Afghan border reference. Pakistani adamant this point, claiming have factual information which his government best qualified assess. In face sympathetic reception this argument by all other Council Representatives, U.S. Delegate withdrew proposal UNQUOTE.

4. Department replied March 2: QUOTE Authorized confirm changes noted your telegram including withdrawal our proposals re Afghan border. FYI We hope obtain further details on nature alleged Pakistani factual data re Communist activity on Afghan border but will pursue subject bilaterally or through Committee Security Experts. END FYI UNQUOTE.

Dist.
Desired
(Offices
Only)

RM/R

Anal 47

Rev

Cat

Herter

ACTING

HERTER

SECRET

Classification

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:WFSpengler:mpt 3/6/59

Airgram transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA:SOA - Leon B. Poullada

Clearances:

FE - Mr. Jones

S/S CR

MAR 6 - 1959 P.M.

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

SECRET

689.900/3-659

689.900/3-659

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

34-S

SECRET

Control: 4838
Rec'd: September 8, 1959
6:58 a.m.

Action
NEA

FROM: Tehran

Info

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: 485, September 8, noon

C

L

INR

H

EUR

UMSC

UIGC

ICA

RMR

SENT DEPARTMENT 485; REPEATED INFORMATION ANKARA 15, KARACHI 9,
LONDON 27.

Pakistan Foreign Minister informed me that during his three
hour audience with Shah yesterday, Shah was as might be
expected quite critical of volume US aid. Pakistan Foreign
Minister seemed sympathetic Iran's case even after I outlined to
him general volume our assistance and dangers being faced here
of inflation. As Pakistan Ambassador was present at audience
hope to report more details within few days.

WAILES

RWN-8

Copy No(s) 113

Destroyed R

Name Date

SECRET

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

680.900/9-859

CAA

CLASSIFIED FILE

NEA
MESSAGE CENTER

FILED

OCT 6-1959

PERMANENT

CORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

34

SECRET

ETI 9/21/59

Action

Control:

13411

Rec'd:

September 19, 1959
6:58 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Tehran

Info

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: 584, September 19, noon.

C

INR

H

SENT DEPARTMENT 584, REPEATED INFORMATION KARACHI 13.

RMR

EMBTEL 485 to Department (repeated 9 to Karachi).

Pakistan Ambassador told me in strict confidence that during Pakistan Foreign Minister's audience with Shah September 7 considerable time was devoted to discussing possible visit to Iran by President Ayub. I gather President indicated he would like to pay informal visit whereas Shah held out for formal visit as this first occasion. Apparently Pakistanis at last agreed with Shah and visit will presumably take place late November after President Ayub has presented constitution to his people.

WAILES

BB: RJE/8

680.500/9-1959

CLASSIFIED FILE

C.A.A.

NE FILED

MESSAGE CENTER

OCT 6-1959

OCT 21 AM 7 19

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

SECRET

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

671 11/16/59

53

SECRET

CORRECTION ISSUED:

11/13/59, 3:16 p.m., LS

Action

Control: 7131

Rec'd: November 12, 1959
9:46 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Tehran - CORRECTED COPY

Info

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1004, November 12, 6 p.m.

G

SP

C

L

H

INR

EUR

PX

RMR

SENT DEPARTMENT 1004, REPEATED INFORMATION KARACHI 22,
LONDON 63.

In private conversation with President of Pakistan last night he told me he was greatly pleased with progress he saw here in Iran and especially so in respect to firmness and vigor of Shah. He said that he was doing what he could to improve inter-country relations and had also taken position with Shah that US had heavy responsibilities and that Shah should not be too disappointed if we could not always give him what he asked for. In this connection he warned Shah that he should not air his disappointment publicly.

→ Shah and British Ambassador joined us about this time and Shah immediately raised question of oil and proposed increased production by IPC in Iraq. He followed same general line reported in EMBTEL 998 but added that per capita income figures for oil from neighboring states indicated Iran far below others especially Kuwait.

Shah then asked if I had seen press report of statement by member congress indicating future aid policy would provide for much greater emphasis toward neutrals at expense of allies and friends. He asked if this was now official US policy and I replied that so far as I knew it was not. Pakistani press said he thought statement might have been made by Senator Fullbright but was not sure. Shah and I agreed that this might be something he would want to discuss with President when he is here.

Copy No(s)

Date

Name

JAK:MB/9

Correction made
by RM/R

SECRET

WAILES

REC 10 10 59

FILED

CLASSIFIED FILE

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

This Document must be Returned
to the RM/R Central Files

500-500/11-11-59

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

30-36

SECRET

GTI 11/16/59

Action

Classification

Control:

7131

NEA

Rec'd:

November 12, 1959

9:46 a.m.

Info

FROM: Tehran

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: 1004, November 12, 6 p.m.

C

L

H

INR

EUR

PX

RMR

SENT DEPARTMENT 1004, REPEATED INFORMATION KARACHI 22, LONDON 63.

In private conversation with President of Pakistan last night he told me he was greatly pleased with progress he saw here in Iran and especially so in rvwtgoivlp* firmness and vigor of Shah. He said that he was doing what he could to improve inter-country relations and had also taken position with Shah that US had heavy responsibilities and that Shah should not be too disappointed if we could not always give him what he asked for. In this connection he warned Shah that he should not air his disappointment publicly.

Shah and British Ambassador joined us about this time and Shah immediately raised question of oil and proposed increased production by IPC in Iraq. He followed same general line reported in EMBTEL 998 but added that per capita income tdkhpses* for oil from neighboring states indicated Iran far below others especailly Kuwait.

Shah then asked if I had seen press report of statement by member congress indicating future aid policy would provide for much greater emphasis toward neutrals at expense of allies and friends. He asked if this was now official US policy and I replied that so far as I knew it was not. Pakistani press said he thought statement might have been made by Senator Fullbright but was not sure. Shah and I agreed that this might be something he would want to discuss with President when he is here.

WAILES

JAK-6

*As received, correction to follow.

SECRET

Classification

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Central File: Decimal File 688.90D, International Political Relations. Other International Relations., Political Relations Between Iran And Pakistan., April 11, 1956 - November 12, 1959. April 11, 1956 - November 12, 1959. MS Iran (Persia): Records of the U.S. Department of State, 1883-1959: Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files, Iran: Internal and Foreign Affairs, 1955-1959. National Archives (United States). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5111341700/GDCS?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDCS&xid=ff40c0fe&pg=3. Accessed 18 Apr. 2022.